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he theme of the American Antitrust Institute’s (AAI) conference 
on June 24, 2010, was embedded in a question: are the 
boundaries between what is public and what is private in transition?  
Our premise was that antitrust strikes a balance between government 
regulation of the economy and an extremely free market system.  
Another way to say this is that there is, on one hand, the public sector, 
represented by the government, and on the other hand, the private 
sector, represented by individuals, families, commercial units, and 
various other associations.  Our concern as experts in antitrust and 
competition policy is in the nuances of the relationship between what, 
at any point in time, is public and what is private because the balance 
establishes the framework in which competition plays its role. 
That relationship may be viewed in many ways, but one starting 
point is to focus on who exercises the dominant influence on 
decisions affecting economic behavior.  In a state-led economy, the 
state (by definition) has the upper hand, at least in certain spheres.  In 
a laissez-faire economy, the private sector has the upper hand in most 
spheres.  By “upper hand,” I mean to indicate whether it is the state or 
the private sector actor who has the greater discretionary power with 
respect to particular kinds of economic decisions.  As we will see, 
there are many points in the real world between the two poles of this 
simple public-private model. 
The balance between public and private has occasionally been 
static, but it is now fairly dynamic around the world.  For example, 
the state in China and India in our lifetimes has yielded considerable 
new leeway to the private side of the equation.  In the United States, 
where a generation ago the traditional apparatus of command-and-
control regulation of much of the U.S. economy yielded to a 
deregulatory model, there is a movement toward more government 
intervention.  The balance between public and private can change as a 
result of an election, as knowledge and ideologies change, as 
technology opens or closes new spheres of activity, or as popular trust 
shifts toward or away from bureaucrats or business leaders.  Or the 
balance may shift as a result of all of these forces and others, such as 
broad economic crisis or public policy recognition of major 
challenges, such as global climate warming, playing out against a 
background of politics. 
And notice that I say “spheres,” in the plural, because influence 
may shift toward the state in some sectors and in some respects while 
it shifts toward the private sector in others.  It may also shift from one 
T
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part of the government, such as the state or municipality, to another, 
such as the federal government, with practical implications for the 
private sector. By inquiring as to whether—and if so, in what ways—
the boundaries between public and private are changing, we move 
beyond a narrow focus on economics in recognition that antitrust is 
part of a political economy. 
Our hypothesis is that the relationship between the government 
and the private sector is in a significant state of transition and that this 
affects the dynamics of competition in specific industries and sectors.  
Many current events topics came readily to mind as we planned the 
conference:  Does health care reform mean that seventeen percent of 
the economy is being taken over by the federal government?  Are we 
being socialized, as some critics have proclaimed?  Does the 
government’s response to the banking meltdown mean that the state 
will play a larger role in the financial services industry in the long 
term?  Do job stimulation and other federal programs responsive to 
the economic recession mean that government intervention in private 
markets is expanding?  Do the Supreme Court’s recent rulings on 
antitrust issues mean that antitrust will not apply as widely to 
regulated sectors? Will this increase or decrease public intervention in 
the economy?  Does the Obama administration’s antitrust rhetoric 
mean that the laissez-faire, semi-libertarian philosophy that 
dominated so much of the past thirty years has now been put out to 
pasture?  What does it mean to say that an entity is “too big to fail,” 
and what is the appropriate government response to such entities?  
Finally, does a perceived crisis in climate warming and energy 
production, including our ability to cap a leak deep below the ocean 
surface, mean that the government’s role in the energy sector will 
inevitably become more powerful? 
Consider this excerpt from a New York Times article by David 
Sanger: 
Mr. Obama reinvigorated a debate about the renewed reach of 
government power, or, alternatively, the power of government 
overreach.  . . .  
 To Mr. Obama, this is all about rebalancing the books after two 
decades in which multinationals sometimes acted like mini-states 
beyond government reach, abetted by a faith in markets that, as Mr. 
Obama put it at Carnegie Mellon University a few weeks ago, 
“gutted regulations and put industry insiders in charge of industry 
oversight.”  When Representative Joe L. Barton, the Texas 
Republican, opened hearings Thursday about the gulf oil gusher by 
accusing Mr. Obama of an unconstitutional “shakedown” of BP to 
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create a “slush fund,” he was giving voice to an alternative 
narrative, a bubbling certainty in corporate suites that Mr. Obama, 
whenever faced with crisis that involves private-sector players, 
reveals himself to be viscerally antibusiness. 
 The reality, not surprisingly, is more complex.1 
At the conference, we tried to identify diverse dots among the 
complexity to see whether they can be connected in a coherent way.  
Our focus, as an antitrust advocacy organization, was on issues that 
relate to competition, but, as I have already suggested, competition 
takes place within a framework established by the government and 
influenced by the overall political culture.  If normative 
understandings about what ought to be private and what ought to be 
public are changing, we should expect this to have an effect on 
competition policy. 
Many of the issues we heard about and discussed could have been 
delivered in time-tested conversations about antitrust and regulation, 
about exemptions and immunities and state action.  Other topics, such 
as public-private partnerships, represent deviations from standard 
antitrust discourse.  The amount of change that seemed to be in the air 
suggested to us that, if we were pouring old wine, it should be into 
new bottles.  In hindsight, we believe that some of the wine is new 
and that a broader view of competition policy will be especially 
helpful at this time. 
In this introduction to the symposium issue of Oregon Law Review, 
I provide a personalized summary of the conference itself, based on 
the live presentations.  The articles that will follow are edited 
elaborations on those presentations.  Because we cannot include 
articles by all of the speakers, I will provide the flow of the entire day, 
ending this introduction with my own effort to link the dots. 
I 
EXEMPTIONS 
The Assistant Attorney General of the United States, Christine 
Varney, provided a keynote address and shared her views on the rise 
of a more flexible approach in antitrust law and policy and the 
 
1 David E. Sanger, Strong Steps or Oversteps? BP Is Latest Example of Tactic by 
Obama, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2010, at A1. 
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absence of a continuing need for certain traditional antitrust 
exemptions in the contemporary era.2 
Ms. Varney began with a review of the recent history of antitrust in 
the United States: 
While the Chicago School introduced a level of much-needed rigor 
into antitrust analysis, the belief that government intervention in the 
market does more harm than good, and that left unfettered the 
market will best protect competition and consumer welfare has, I 
believe, been discredited.  I think many would agree that the days of 
excessive antitrust intervention are behind us, thanks in part to the 
Chicago School, and this is a good thing.3 
But antitrust enforcement is now in need of some reinvigoration.4  
The pendulum swing that began in the 1970s, and that was propelled 
by the Chicago School’s belief in the supremacy of markets, has gone 
too far in the direction of skepticism about enforcement and reliance 
on the markets’ abilities to self correct.5 
In the modern era of antitrust, she said, many exemptions are not 
needed, simply because antitrust applies a flexible approach to so 
many collaborative activities.6 
To put it plainly, the complaint that antitrust law is frequently too 
rigid to accommodate efficiency-enhancing business behavior has 
been overtaken by events.  The reality is that efficient behavior is 
ultimately beneficial for fair and free markets, and is consistent with 
the aims of antitrust.  Antitrust law and enforcement policy has the 
ability to prevent anticompetitive behavior without stifling the kinds 
of innovative, procompetitive business behavior that keeps our 
dynamic economy moving and growing while promoting consumer 
welfare.7 
With this background, she explored the reasons why “it is time to 
retire” a particular exemption, the McCarran-Ferguson Act’s 
 
2 Christine A. Varney, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Keynote Address at 
the American Antitrust Institute’s 11th Annual Conference: Public and Private: Are the 
Boundaries in Transition? (June 24, 2010) [hereinafter Varney Keynote Address]; see also 
Christine A. Varney, Antitrust Immunities, 89 OR. L. REV. 775 (2011). 
3 Varney Keynote Address, supra note 2. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
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exemption of the business of insurance.8  This is a topic that is also 
taken up in this issue in articles by Beth Farmer9 and Randy Stutz.10  
Despite the Obama administration’s support of repeal limited to the 
context of health care reform, the exemption remains on the books. 
Ms. Varney closed with a few observations about antitrust 
exemptions.  First, “new legislative exemptions for specific industries 
should be avoided.”11  Second, “when new exemptions are considered 
or existing exemptions are going to be redesigned, there are better and 
worse ways to go about it.”12  Finally, “exemptions for regulated 
industries, whether in statute or judicial precedent, should be 
narrowly construed.”13 
My comment is that skepticism of exemptions does not represent a 
change from previous Department of Justice (DOJ) policy.  If 
antitrust represents one form of government intervention, an 
exemption from antitrust may represent a high degree of freedom 
from government oversight for private decision making—unless, as 
often occurs, the exemption responds to an enhanced framework of 
more direct government regulation.  In the case of insurance, as Beth 
Farmer points out in her article, the exemption from federal antitrust 
reflects an allocation of power to the state level, not (in theory at 
least) a withdrawal of the insurance industry from regulation.14  To 
the extent the Obama administration succeeds in reducing the role of 
exemptions, this may result in a greater role for antitrust, which 
would likely enhance the federal regulatory role.  With respect to the 
Obama administration’s announced efforts to give antitrust 
enforcement a more aggressive role,15 this could tilt the balance 
between public and private in the public direction, keeping in mind 
that antitrust is one of the lightest forms of government intervention.  
At the time of the conference, while the appointments and the rhetoric 
of the Obama administration reflect an intent to make more use of the 
 
8 Id. 
9 Susan Beth Farmer, Competition and Regulation in the Insurance Sector: Reassessing 
the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 89 OR. L. REV. 915 (2011). 
10 Randy Stutz, Market Allocation in the Health Insurance Industry and the McCarran-
Ferguson Act, 89 OR. L. REV. 885 (2011). 
11 Varney Keynote Address, supra note 2. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Farmer, supra note 9. 
15 Stutz, supra note 10. 
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antitrust laws, there were relatively few cases on the basis of which an 
evaluation can be made. 
II 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE: ARE THE BOUNDARIES MOVING?  THREE 
CHALLENGES IN COMPETITION POLICY 
In this plenary session, we introduced three areas of activity that 
are not often discussed in antitrust conferences but are highly relevant 
to any serious look at how the economy is or is not changing and what 
this implies for competition policy.16 
Setting standards was the topic of Chris Sagers, a professor of law 
at Cleveland-Marshall College of Law.17  Professor Sagers placed 
standard setting in an area between regulation by the government and 
regulation by the market, thereby directly questioning the value of a 
public-private polarity, or at least presenting a third model.18  He 
emphasized the ubiquity and importance of standards; their long 
history; the peculiar role of engineering ethics wherein the 
representatives of companies in setting standards sometimes give 
higher value to professional, technical values than to the interests of 
their companies; and that setting standards takes place largely outside 
the supervision of either the market or the government.19  He noted 
that it is difficult successfully to sue standard-setting organizations 
and that many standards are being adopted into law, usually with little 
discussion of their substance by legislators and sometimes even on a 
basis of adoption of future amendments that will be incorporated into 
law by reference.20 
Although not stressed by Professor Sagers in his talk, the rapid 
emergence of new high-tech industries has increased the importance 
of standards, often because a standard is the focal point for 
interoperability between networks.  Moreover, whereas antitrust has 
traditionally intervened in setting standards only in the most 
 
16 The moderator of this session was Phil Weiser, the Senior Advisor for Technology 
and Innovation to the National Economic Council Director. 
17 Chris Sagers, Standardization and Markets: Just Exactly Who Is the Government, and 
Why Should Antitrust Care?, 89 OR. L. REV. 785 (2011). 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
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outrageous abuse situations, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
has taken a more active role in recent years, particularly in the 
development of a policy against “patent ambush,”21 which occurs 
when a participant in setting standards owns a patent that it fails to 
disclose at the time the standard is being adopted but later, as a result 
of the adoption, holds a monopoly position and can reap monopoly 
rents.  By the FTC’s becoming more engaged with the standard-
setting process, one can argue that the degree of freedom for self-
regulation by private parties has been somewhat reduced. 
The role of public-private partnerships was introduced by Michael 
Likosky, a senior fellow at New York University’s Institute for Public 
Knowledge.22 Professor Likosky traced the evolution of public-
private partnerships from leasing of existing infrastructure (e.g., 
parking meters) to a new stage, after the Iraq War, in which large 
private equity funds began seeking access to the lucrative U.S. public 
works sector.23  The basic trade-off is that the private investors build 
new projects like roads, telecommunications, water and sewage 
plants, and wind farms and other energy projects,24 and the projects 
are funded by user fees, and a return of capital is guaranteed by the 
government over a long term, perhaps thirty or forty years.25  The 
projects appeal to the government because they are “off-budget.”26  
The government benefits from the capital improvements without 
putting forth the up-front capital.27 
Typically, these projects assume a monopoly position, and the 
government bears most of the risk.  If the return on investment does 
not meet projections, the project may increase user fees (likely to be a 
form of regressive taxation), or the government may have to make up 
the shortfall.  This gives the government an investment in maintaining 
a long-term monopoly over which it has relinquished regulatory 
power.  Because the projects usually involve the most appealing 
 
21 Id. 
22 Michael Likosky, Senior Fellow, Institute for Public Knowledge, New York 
University, Panel Titled Public and Private: Are the Boundaries Moving? Three 
Challenges in Competition Policy at the American Antitrust Institute’s 11th Annual 
Conference: Public and Private: Are the Boundaries in Transition? (June 24, 2010). 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
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assets of the government, the projects can deprive the government of 
revenues with which it might have cross-subsidized other 
governmental functions in the future.  Professor Likosky also 
described the large fees that are generated for bankers, law firms, and 
consultants, which are not tied to assumption of risk.28  He pointed 
out that the government often obtains advice on these projects from 
investment bankers who later become beneficiaries.29  Raising 
questions but not fundamentally disapproving of public-private 
partnerships, Professor Likosky proposed a governmental 
infrastructure bank (e.g., for energy) in which conflicting interests 
could be converged and risks could be more equitably addressed.30 
Thus the development of public-private partnerships in very recent 
years represents a new flow of power from the government to private 
parties, and it raises significant questions about long-term government 
support for private monopolies. 
The third example of changing relations between what is public 
and what is private is the government-sponsored enterprise (GSE), 
such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  The presenter was Jonathan 
Koppell, Director of the School of Public Affairs, Arizona State 
University.  Because these publicly funded GSEs are presently in 
conservatorship, the government must now decide how to treat them 
going forward.  Dr. Koppell suggested that two questions should be 
separated.31  First, what, if any, role should the government play in 
promoting home ownership?32  Current policies alter the landscape 
for capital investment decisions, giving the housing sector an 
advantage over other sectors, although the GSEs are only one of many 
programs that have this effect.33  Second, if there is to be government 
intervention in the housing sector, what institutional form should it 
take?34  The GSE form, Dr. Koppell said, is an accident of history 
 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Jonathan Koppell, Director of the School of Public Affairs, Arizona State University, 
Panel Titled Public and Private: Are the Boundaries Moving? Three Challenges in 
Competition Policy at the American Antitrust Institute’s 11th Annual Conference: Public 
and Private: Are the Boundaries in Transition? (June 24, 2010). 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
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rather than the result of an ideological or policy-driven calculation.35  
Like the public-private partnerships that Professor Likosky discussed, 
GSEs are organized in a way that keeps the government’s funding 
“off-budget,” which Dr. Koppell called dishonest, particularly under 
current circumstances.36 
Dr. Koppell outlined four options: (a) to make the GSEs explicitly 
government agencies, (b) to improve the GSE structure following a 
public utility model, (c) to fully privatize them, or (d) to provide a 
more direct subsidy to housing with minimal institutional overhang.37  
Every solution, he says, has trade-offs.38  The GSE, as it stands, has 
modest public control and very limited competition.39  He asks 
whether we are willing to relinquish some level of public control with 
the goal of enhancing private competition.40 
Here we have a strange hybrid institution that, having failed in a 
serious way, currently faces an uncertain future. 
III 
INDUSTRY-SPECIFIC PRESENTATIONS 
The conference at this point broke into four simultaneous sessions 
that dealt with specific sectors of the economy: insurance, financial 
institutions, telecommunications, and transportation.41 
In his introduction to the panel on insurance, Lawrence Mirel, 
former Commissioner of Insurance for the District of Columbia, 
asked whether repeal of the McCarran-Ferguson Act (exempting the 
business of insurance from federal antitrust exposure) is a good idea 
and whether it would benefit consumers.42  He identified several 
 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Summaries of the breakout sessions may be found at AMERICAN ANTITRUST 
INSTITUTE 11TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE, JUNE 24, 2010, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE: ARE THE 
BOUNDARIES IN TRANSITION?, BREAKOUT SESSION SUMMARY (2010), available at 
http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/sites/default/files/Insurance%20Breakout%20Session%20
Summary_071120101659.pdf. 
42 Lawrence Mirel, Partner, Wiley Rein, Introduction to the Panel on Insurance at the 
American Antitrust Institute’s 11th Annual Conference: Public and Private: Are the 
Boundaries in Transition? (June 24, 2010).   
FOER 4/6/2011  11:41 AM 
2011] An Introduction to the American Antitrust Institute’s 763 
11th Annual National Conference 
potential drawbacks: (1) the risk that repeal would harm small and 
local insurers, which depend on collaborative information sharing to 
accurately price their products; (2) the risk that repeal would result in 
higher insurance premiums; and (3) the risk that repeal would lead to 
increased concentration in the insurance industry.43 
Randy Stutz, an AAI Research Fellow, provided a history of the 
insurance exemption.44  Agreeing with Assistant Attorney General 
Varney, he stressed that antitrust had evolved since passage of the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act and that the rule of reason now protected 
most of the information sharing that the industry needs.45  He also 
suggested that the state action doctrine could be used where necessary 
to further protect the industry without need for an overall 
exemption.46  Mr. Stutz then called attention to the evolution of the 
Blue Cross/Blue Shield companies, which have traditionally not 
permitted their companies to cross into one another’s geographical 
markets.47  While concluding that it is unclear whether allocation of 
insurance markets is exempted by the McCarran-Ferguson Act, he 
predicted that repeal would increase the hitherto rather light scrutiny 
given to the absence of Blue-on-Blue competition.48  If the Blues 
could be induced to compete against one another, concentration in 
health insurance would be dramatically reduced.49 
Beth Farmer, a professor of law at The Dickinson School of Law, 
urged that the McCarran-Ferguson Act’s major feature is not antitrust 
but rather the allocation of power and deference among the federal 
government and the states, although she thought that the antitrust 
exemption is overbroad and unnecessary.50 
The session on financial institutions dealt with two topical issues: 
the too-big-to-fail (TBTF) problem and interchange fees.51  Financial 
reform legislation, pending at the time of the conference, was 
 
43 Id. 
44 Stutz, supra note 10. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Farmer, supra note 9. 
51 This panel was moderated by K. Craig Wildfang, Partner, Robins, Kaplan, Miller & 
Ciresi LLP. 
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described by Arthur E. Wilmarth, a professor of law at the George 
Washington University Law School.52  Professor Wilmarth argued 
that the primary objective of the legislation should be to eliminate 
TBTF subsidies and that sweeping structural reform, which separates 
traditional banking from high-risk investment banking in complex 
institutions, is necessary to curb excessive risk taking among large 
financial conglomerates.53  Because financial reform legislation has 
now passed, I leave it to Professor Wilmarth’s article in this volume 
to update his analysis.54 
A financial services expert, attorney Henry Polmer, took up 
another issue—interchange fees—that has since been partially dealt 
with by the financial reform legislation.55  He argued that these fees, 
which are so important to merchants and consumers as well as the 
credit and debit card industries, should be subject to some form of 
federal utility regulation.56  Mr. Polmer concluded that the Durbin 
Amendment, which was subsequently incorporated into the legislation 
that passed Congress, signals a willingness in Congress to begin 
viewing debit card interchange fees as a public utility.57  He stressed 
that this view should be extended to credit card interchange fees.58  
Lastly, he argued that the United States should draw from the 
experiences of Australia, New Zealand, and the European 
Commission in their successful application of antitrust law and 
competition policy to protect their consumers against excessive, 
duopoly-imposed interchange fees.59 
My comment is, given that so much of the recent financial crisis 
has been so widely blamed on inadequate regulation of a dynamic 
 
52 Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate Response to 
the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 951 (2011). 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Henry Polmer, Panel on Financial Institutions at the American Antitrust Institute’s 
11th Annual Conference: Public and Private: Are the Boundaries in Transition? (June 24, 
2010). 
56 For background on the interchange industry’s competition problems and elaboration 
on the arguments presented by Mr. Polmer, see my paper (prepared with Mr. Polmer’s 
important input) for the AAI.  ALBERT A. FOER, ELECTRONIC PAYMENT SYSTEMS AND 
INTERCHANGE FEES: BREAKING THE LOG JAM ON SOLUTIONS TO MARKET POWER (2010), 
available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/sites/default/files/Interchange%20Foer.pdf. 
57 Polmer, supra note 55. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
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financial services sector, crucial parts of which had altogether escaped 
regulatory oversight, it should come as no surprise that financial 
reform will expand the federal government’s role in this sector.  
Although there will be some curtailment of what certain private 
institutions can do, more drastic measures that could have increased 
the role of competition (such as establishing caps on the size of 
financial institutions in order to restore competition) were not 
adopted.  The government’s enhanced obligation to look for systemic 
risks and new authority that may authorize action when systemic risks 
are found seems to reflect an understanding that the cause of the 
financial collapse had less to do with the size of corporate entities 
than with their interconnectedness to the larger economy.  In the 
absence of future crises, it is not clear that this enhanced authority 
will increase the government’s day-to-day potential for intervention.  
In the case of interchange fees, Congress stepped into a long-playing 
dispute between merchants and consumers, on the one hand, and 
bankers and credit card companies, on the other.  With private 
negotiations unable to resolve the problem, antitrust litigation 
unlikely to provide a solution, and examples of direct regulation in 
other countries showing the way, the only question is why Congress 
dealt only with debit cards and not also with credit cards. 
The telecommunications panel was moderated by Jonathan Baker, 
the Chief Economist of the Federal Communications Commission, 
and panelists included Joseph Farrell, Director of the Federal Trade 
Commission’s Bureau of Economics, and Marius Schwartz, a 
professor of economics at Georgetown University.  The future-
oriented, wide-ranging conversation focused on the National 
Broadband Plan, which had recently been issued by the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC), and raised questions of what 
the government’s role will be in the regulation of broadband, 
particularly with respect to questions of access.  Unfortunately, 
articles were not prepared for this session. 
The final breakout session covered issues relating to the 
transportation sector.60  Peter Carstensen, a professor of law at 
University of Wisconsin Law School, reported on statutory 
 
60 The moderator was Spencer Weber Waller, Professor and Director, Institute for 
Consumer Antitrust Studies, Loyola University Chicago School of Law. 
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immunities related to transportation.61  Professor Carstensen 
identified six exemptions from antitrust law for various aspects of the 
transportation industries.62  The main notion of his presentation was 
that these exemptions no longer serve their historic purpose of 
shielding regulatorily supervised, private agreements over rates and 
service as well as mergers among rate-regulated transportation 
providers from the conflicting demands of antitrust.63  According to 
Professor Carstensen, the transportation agencies should not be 
removed from the process, as they play an important role in 
establishing rules and regulations; establishing reporting 
requirements; and providing continuing oversight, monitoring, and 
investigative capacity.64  Professor Carstensen argued, however, that 
all current exemptions for the transportation industries should be 
repealed.65  Further, he proposed a new process whereby the 
transportation entities engaged in joint ventures could request a 
“robust business review clearance” from the relevant regulatory 
agency and the DOJ.66  If the DOJ were to approve the clearance, the 
parties would be exempt from antitrust liability for the actions 
specifically approved, with periodic review and the ability of the DOJ 
to withdraw the clearance on a going-forward basis.67 
John Kwoka Jr., a professor of economics at Northeastern 
University, discussed the plight of the U.S. automobile industry.68  As 
a result of the recent bailout, two of the U.S. Big Three—General 
Motors (GM) and Chrysler—were now suddenly owned by the 
United States and Canada.69  Professor Kwoka began with a history 
of how the U.S. auto manufacturers had lost their way and the real but 
limited role the U.S. government had played in subsidizing the 
 
61 Peter C. Carstensen, Replacing Antitrust Exemptions for Transportation Industries: 
The Potential for a “Robust Business Review Clearance,” 89 OR. L. REV. 1059 (2011). 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 John Kwoka, Jr., Panel on Transportation at the American Antitrust Institute’s 11th 
Annual Conference: Public and Private: Are the Boundaries in Transition? (June 24, 
2010). 
69 Id. 
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industry, but not individual companies, until the recent bailouts.70  He 
described the public policy choice between allowing a bankruptcy 
without bailout and providing short-term liquidity to specific 
companies, to be followed by bankruptcy and reorganization.71  
Professor Kwoka agreed that, because of their size and 
interdependence with other sectors of the economy, the U.S. 
automakers were “too big to fail.”72  He claimed that the 
government’s challenge now is to ensure that the companies adopt 
different operating and management strategies so that such 
intervention is not again required for the foreseeable future.73  
Professor Kwoka concluded that, by requiring fundamental changes 
in GM and Chrysler as conditions for intervention, the Obama 
administration has in fact pursued a prudent approach toward the auto 
industry.74 
My comments are that removing the transportation exemptions 
would add an overlay of antitrust exposure without reducing existing 
regulation.  Thus, if Professor Carstensen’s view75 were to be 
enacted, the state would gain incrementally vis-à-vis the regulated 
industries.  But Professor Carstensen is not the transportation tsar, and 
there is no indication that his proposals are about to change the face 
of regulation.  In the case of the auto industry, on the other hand, the 
bailout resulted in a historic transfer of ownership from the private to 
the public sector, but there is a high probability that this will be a 
temporary transfer imposed to create as painless a transition as 
possible from bankruptcy to reorganization.  Neither GM nor Chrysler 
is intended to be a yardstick company, and the government, other than 
ousting the CEO of GM, has apparently not taken a particularly active 
role in running either company.  Nonetheless, competitive auto 
companies worry that government ownership will provide unfair 
advantages to the bailed-out companies. 
 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 See Carstensen, supra note 61. 
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IV 
HEALTH CARE REFORM AND COMPETITION 
In a plenary session, Thomas Greaney, a professor of law at St. 
Louis University School of Law, and Barak Richman, a professor of 
law at Duke University School of Law, explained how the extensive 
new health reform might impact competition.76  Professor Greaney 
pointed to a variety of imperfections in the health care market that are 
to one extent or another addressed by the reform legislation.77  Much 
depends on the specifics of rules and regulations that must be worked 
out by the administration.78 
Standard microeconomic models do not apply well.  The delivery 
system is fragmented and uncoordinated.  The insurance system is 
highly concentrated.  Hospitals and medical practices have been 
allowed to become concentrated through mergers.  Bilateral 
monopoly occurs in many health markets, and there is inadequate 
entry at all levels.  Professor Greaney believes, or at least hopes, that 
the reforms will address many of the imperfections.79  For example, 
the proposed market exchanges should reduce adverse selection.  Half 
the new legislation offers up demonstrations and pilots that could 
result in new entry, changed attitudes, and efficient innovations.80  A 
major example is the creation of Accountable Care Organizations that 
will go into effect in 2012.  He stressed that these need to be 
structured deliberately if they are to create greater competition; if 
improperly monitored, they instead could strengthen cartels and 
market power.81  Meanwhile, a new wave of mergers among hospitals 
and physician groups seems to be underway, requiring that health care 
sector mergers be given serious attention by the antitrust agencies.82 
Professor Richman noted that, with the employer at the center of 
the health care system, purchasers of health care do not give the usual 
scrutiny to their purchases because withheld wages that go to buy 
 
76 The session was moderated by Max Huffman, Associate Professor of Law and 
Dean’s Fellow, Indiana University School of Law. 
77 Thomas L. Greaney, The Affordable Care Act and Competition Policy: Antidote or 
Placebo?, 89 OR. L. REV. 811 (2011). 
78 Id. 
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insurance are essentially invisible.83  This may help account for the 
misplaced antitrust sympathy shown toward hospital and doctor group 
mergers, which were portrayed as community assets bracing 
themselves against purchasing groups and Health Maintenance 
Organizations (HMO).84  The combination of market power and 
insurance led to higher prices and more distortion than simple market 
power has.85  Reform was a missed opportunity to address 
foundational problems in the provision and financing of health care 
services.86  Because concentration is already a big problem and 
deconcentration seems unlikely, the antitrust authorities will have to 
focus on conduct—including tying and bundling—as well as 
mergers.87  Increased medical tourism may be one response to 
concentration.88 
It is fair to say that neither speaker was especially optimistic, but 
both saw value in the reforms.  Even though the federal government 
and the states will play a larger role than in the past, there are 
possibilities for competition to play a larger role, but much will 
depend on the ways the various specifics of reform are rolled out and 
enforced—and how private parties respond. 
V 
ENERGY REFORM AND COMPETITION 
While health care reform was accomplished legislatively just prior 
to the conference and financial reform was accomplished shortly 
after, energy reform (as this is written) remains bogged down in 
Congress.  The two presenters at our plenary session on energy 
reform were Peter Fox-Penner, Principal of The Brattle Group and 
author of Smart Power: Climate Change, the Smart Grid, and the 
Future of Electric Utilities, and Susan Kelly, Vice President of Policy 
 
83 Clark C. Havighurst & Barack D. Richman, The Provider Monopoly Problem in 
Health Care, 89 OR. L. REV. 847 (2011). 
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Analysis and General Counsel of the American Public Power 
Association and President of the Energy Bar Association.89 
Ms. Kelly pointed out that the American Public Power Association 
is itself a good example of the difficulty of talking about what is 
public and what is private.90  It is an organization of publicly owned 
(i.e., owned by units of state and local government) providers of retail 
utility services that compete against investor-owned “public utilities” 
that are regulated.91  The publicly owned power companies were 
designed to be yardsticks that could curb the worst abuses of investor-
owned (private) utilities.92 
Ms. Kelly’s presentation focused on the challenges presented to the 
energy sector by public policies dealing with climate change.93  Of 
particular note are the investment challenge (the hugely expensive 
infrastructure that will be needed) and the questions of how much 
demand will grow, how consumers will be able to make choices in an 
era of smart meters, and how angry ratepayers can be induced to 
accept higher rates at a time when credit rating companies are 
watching utilities so closely for deteriorating credit quality.94  Ms. 
Kelly also questioned the recent history of the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC), which had preferred competition to 
regulation under President Bush and apparently has not changed 
much under President Obama, recently going so far as to say that it 
did not have to consider antitrust in its decisions (a position that it 
claims it has never taken).95  She expressed concern that the Great 
Depression era’s Federal Power Act is in danger of being used by the 
 
89 This session was moderated by Diana Moss, Vice President and Senior Fellow, 
American Antitrust Institute. Articles were not produced for this session.  For useful 
background information, see Diana L. Moss & John Kwoka, Jr., Competition Policy and 
the Transition to a Low-Carbon, Efficient Electricity Industry (Am. Antitrust Inst., 
Working Paper No. 10-02, 2010), available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/sites 
/default/files/AAI%20Working%20Paper%20No.%2010-02_Moss%20and%20Kwoka_El 
ec%20Comp_051820101303.pdf. 
90 Susan Kelly, Vice President of Policy Analysis and General Counsel, American 
Public Power Ass’n, Panel on Energy Reform and Competition at the American Antitrust 
Institute’s 11th Annual Conference: Public and Private: Are the Boundaries in Transition? 
(June 24, 2010). 
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FERC to favor some resources over others—even though a utility’s 
resource mix is traditionally within the purview of states and local 
governments.96 
Dr. Fox-Penner also focused on climate warming as one of two 
major drivers of change in the energy sector97 and agreed with Ms. 
Kelly that the huge costs imposed on both public and private entities 
will trigger rate increases.  There are still major technology risks to be 
overcome as well, and one cannot assume that a competitive 
generation market, for example, can work without careful 
governance.98  The second driver he discussed is the so-called smart 
grid.99  A particular characteristic having a disruptive effect will be 
the transparency of short-term prices and the ability to adjust demand 
to price.100  He predicted it will take one or two decades to shift ten 
percent of peak load into off-peak usage, and this will require 
educating residents and developing appliances that will keep their 
decisions simple.101  Dr. Fox-Penner also described the coming 
collision between vertical integration and separation/deregulation and 
how this will require the government to develop new tools of 
regulation.102  The government’s structure itself is a problem.103  The 
states still have the bulk of authority to regulate the electricity 
industry, despite the FERC’s increased role.104  However, the level at 
which regulation is most needed—the regional level—has virtually no 
workable institutions.105 
In terms of changes in public-private relationships, not much can 
be said until legislation is finally passed.  The smart grid would 
represent a major transformation in which individual and business 
consumers would have a role that is much greater than their current 
role.  At the same time, we can probably expect many regulatory 
 
96 Id. 
97 See Peter Fox-Penner & Heidi Bishop, Mission, Structure, and Governance in Future 
Electric Markets: Some Observations, 89 OR. L. REV. 1107 (2011). 
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decisions to move from the state level to a regional level (if 
institutions can be created) and to the federal level.  The 
government’s influence on the private sector will likely be felt in 
terms of programs that give advantage (or disadvantage) to particular 
types of fuel and to various supports for energy conservation. 
VI 
SOME OBSERVATIONS ABOUT PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
The distinction between what is public and what is private can best 
be viewed as a simplistic bipolar model.  In between are a myriad of 
mixtures of public and private: yardstick public corporations, GSEs, 
public-private partnerships, standard-setting organizations, private 
associations of publicly owned utilities, private utilities that are 
publicly regulated in varying degrees, publicly traded private 
companies in which the public is the major stockholder, financial 
services firms that are regulated differently according to their size and 
interconnectedness—to name some of the intermediate mixtures that 
we examined in the conference.  Plainly, there are varying ways one 
can be private and varying ways a government can exercise influence 
over private commercial behavior. 
It is apparent that the power to make or influence decisions, as 
between the government and the private sector, is in a state of flux.  
Passage of major national financial reform and health care legislation 
and the clear recognition that climate change will require major 
energy reform—together accounting for a major portion of the 
national economy—are shaking up both existing industries and 
government.  For the most part, but not by any means exclusively, 
these changes reflect a movement away from the pole of completely 
free markets toward more state intervention, although much of this 
movement occurs in industries that have long been affected with a 
public interest and greater or lesser degrees of government 
intervention.  Even the auto industry, now partially but probably only 
temporarily owned by governments, had a history of financial 
advantages from government, although the urgency of the bailout led 
to a significantly increased role for government. 
In both the financial sector and the health care sector, much of the 
story remains to be determined, based in large part on how the 
interstices of the legislation are filled in by government and how the 
private sector reacts to new incentives and disincentives.  The 
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overhang of pending energy reform currently affects decision making 
in sectors far removed from the production or distribution of energy. 
What does all this have to do with antitrust?  Antitrust mediates 
between the state and the private sector as a relatively light form of 
regulation, working on an after-the-fact basis only when private 
decisions are outside generally expressed bounds.  The generality and 
flexibility of its rules provide guidance but do not command.  
Antitrust can be a substitute for more direct forms of regulation.  It 
can also be an adjunct to regulation, a subject that is itself in flux in 
light of recent Supreme Court decisions.106 
Several collision points between what is public and what is private 
find their loci in the application of antitrust laws: exemptions and 
immunities, state action, and the ability to force access to essential 
facilities owned by private companies.  Exemptions from antitrust 
amount to a degree of freedom for private decisions from federal 
oversight.  Removal of exemptions do not necessarily mean more 
freedom, however, as exemptions and immunities are often tied to 
forms of regulation at the state or local level and may relate to 
allocation of power within a federal system rather than allocation of 
power between the public and private sectors. 
We set out to see if we could connect some dots in a meaningful 
pattern.  It seems that ideology and theory played a large role in 
bringing the U.S. economy to the present balance between public and 
private, a structure that might be described as mostly private markets 
marbled with government interventions ranging from nearly invisible 
to highly intrusive.  I think the clearest pattern in the current transition 
seems to be a moderate swing away from the theory and ideology of 
free markets to a strong concern with what will work in a time of 
multiple crises.  Empirically driven pragmatism is a far cry from 
claims of an antibusiness, socialist takeover that we hear from 
ideologues and stakeholders in the status quo. 
 
106 Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264 (2007); Verizon Commc’ns, 
Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004). 
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